Quantum Cryptanalysis in the RAM Model: Claw-Finding Attacks on SIKE

Samuel Jaques and John M. Schanck



Models of quantum computers

- NIST is working on post-quantum public key standards
- This requires quantum cryptanalysis
- This requires models of quantum computers

How do you imagine a quantum computer?



Surface code estimates

costs





Cryptographers



Quantum cost analysis





Quantum cost analysis





Quantum cost analysis



Motivation	Memory peripheral framework	Cost models	Analysis of SIKE	Summary
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Outline				

1 Motivation

- 2 Memory peripheral framework
- 3 Cost models
- 4 Analysis of SIKE

5 Summary

Motivation		
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Goal 1: Fairly compare classical and quantum resources

How do we compare a quantum bit of security to a classical bit of security? How do we cost mixed classical/quantum algorithms like Kuperberg's sieve?

Motivation		
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Goal 1: Fairly compare classical and quantum resources

How do we compare a quantum bit of security to a classical bit of security? How do we cost mixed classical/quantum algorithms like Kuperberg's sieve?

Previous work: Analysis of Brassard-Høyer-Tapp (BHT)

- BHT provided a quantum collision-finding algorithm with quantum access to classical memory.
- Bernstein argued van Oorschot-Wiener is more efficient after fully accounting for memory costs.

Brassard, Høyer, Tapp. 1997. Quantum Algorithm for the Collision Problem

Bernstein. 2009. Cost analysis of hash collisions: Will quantum computers make SHARCS obsolete?

Motivation		
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Goal 2: View gates as processes





Motivation		
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Goal 3: Include error correction

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Many physical qubits

One logical qubit

Memory peripheral framework		
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Memory peripheral framework

Main Idea

Model computation as "memory" acted on by a "memory controller".

Examples:

- Turing machine: head + tape
- RAM: CPU + random access memory
- Quantum circuit: Random access machine + qubits

Premises:

- **1** Memory is a physical system that changes over time
- 2 A memory controller interacts with a memory
- 3 The **cost** of a computation is the number of interactions

Memory peripheral framework		
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Premise 1: Memory is a physical system

Free evolution

Caused by:

- Noise
- Ballistic computation

Costly evolution

Caused by the controller.

We model a quantum computer as a **parallel random access machine** with new instructions for quantum gates

• e.g.: apply gate x to qubit y at time t

Result: quantum algorithms are classical programs

Memory peripheral framework		
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Premise 2: Memory controller



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	Memory peripheral framework		
Premise 3: C	ost		

The **cost** of a computation is the number of interactions.

- We ignore the construction cost
- We focus on the cost to the controller

There are opportunity costs: What else could the controller do?

	Cost models ●000	
Cost models		

We provide physical justifications for two cost models: G-cost and DW-cost.

Both are qubit memories with a standard universal gate set (Clifford + T).

Differences:

- *G*-cost: **Passive** error correction.
- **D***W*-cost: **Active** error correction.

Motivation 000	Memory peripheral framework	Cost models 0●00	Analysis of SIKE	Summary O
Error corr	ection			

Passive/Non-volatile memory

To preserve: keep cool.

- Paper
- Magnetic discs

Active/Volatile memory

To preserve: continuously refresh.

- DRAM
- Surface codes (quantum)

	Cost models	
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Bravyi and Terhal. 2009. A no-go theorem for a two-dimensional self-correcting quantum memory based on stabilizer codes.
 Kitaev. 2003. Fault-tolerant quantum computation by anyons.

Dennis, Kitaev, Landahl, Preskill. 2002. Topological Quantum Memory.

	Cost models	
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Costs				

G-cost

 Assumption: Passive error correction. (Physical, not just technological, assumption)

- Cost: 1 RAM operation per gate
- Total cost: Number of gates ("G")

DW-cost

- Assumption: Active error correction.
- Cost: 1 RAM operation per qubit per time step
- Total cost: Depth×Width ("DW")

	Analysis of SIKE	

Analysis of SIKE



- *E*₀ is public parameter,
 E/*A* is public key
- Parameterized by a large prime p (e.g. p ≈ 2⁴³⁴)
- Red path is secret key (length log p/2)

	Analysis of SIKE 000000000	

Meet-in-the-middle



	Analysis of SIKE 00●0000000	

Tani's collision-finding algorithm

To find a collision between two functions $f : X \to S$ and $g : Y \to S$:

- Random walk on two Johnson graphs: one over X, the other over Y
- Check for collisions at each step
- Make it quantum!

Johnson graph over X

Vertices: *R*-element subsets of a fixed set *X*. Vertices *u* and *v* are adjacent iff $|u \cap v| = R - 1$.

Tani. 2007. An improved claw finding algorithm using quantum walk.

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Query-optimal parameters:

$$R = \#$$
 queries = time

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Johnson graph over X

Vertices: *R*-element subsets of a fixed set *X*. Vertices *u* and *v* are adjacent iff $|u \cap v| = R - 1$.

Query-optimal parameters to attack SIKE:

$$R = \#$$
 queries = time = $p^{1/6+o(1)}$

Tani. 2007. An improved claw finding algorithm using quantum walk.

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	Analysis of SIKE	

Memory access



		Analysis of SIKE	
Memory a	access		

Classical Query: 9



		Analysis of SIKE	
Memory a	access		

Classical Query: 9



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Memory a	access			

Quantum Query:



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Quantum Query:



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Memory a	access		

Quantum Query:



Analogy for Cryptographers

- Any physical "side channel" leaks information
- Any leaked information decoheres (destroys) the state
- Controller must implement circuits for all possible inputs

	Analysis of SIKE	

Memory costs

For N bits of random-access quantum memory:

Idle memory

- *G*-cost: Free
- *DW*-cost: *O*(*N*) RAM ops per time step

Random access

- G-cost: O(N) RAM ops
- *DW*-cost: *O*(*N* log *N*) RAM ops

	Analysis of SIKE	
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Johnson vertex data structure

History independence

For quantum interference between random walk paths, the representation of a vertex must be independent of the path taken.

Bernstein, Jeffery, Lange, Meurer. 2013. Quantum algorithms for the subset-sum problem

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History-dependent:

Binary tree as linked list

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History-dependent:

Binary tree as linked list

History-independent:

- Quantum radix tree: superposition over all layouts
- Sorted array: physically in order

Bernstein, Jeffery, Lange, Meurer. 2013. Quantum algorithms for the subset-sum problem

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	Analysis of SIKE 000000●000	

Idea: We already pay O(N) for memory access, so pay O(N) to physically sort array:

$$A':$$
0...0000 $A:$ a_1 ... a_{k-1} a_k a_{k+1} ... a_{R-1} \bot

	Analysis of SIKE	
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1. "Fan out" an input x



	Analysis of SIKE	
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1. "Fan out" an input x

$$A':$$
 X \cdots X X X \cdots X X
 $A:$ a_1 \cdots a_{k-1} a_k a_{k+1} \cdots a_{R-1} \perp

	Analysis of SIKE	

2. Compare all elements simultaneously



	Analysis of SIKE 000000●000	

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<i>A''</i> :	0	 0	1	1	 1	1
A ' :	x	 x	x	x	 x	x
A :	a ₁	 a_{k-1}	a _k	a_{k+1}	 a _{R-1}	x

	Analysis of SIKE	

3. Conditionally swap "up"



	Analysis of SIKE	

3. Conditionally swap "up"

A '' :	0	 0	1	1	 1	1
A ' :	x	 x	x	a _k	 a _{R-2}	a_{R-1}
A :	a_1	 a_{k-1}	x	x	 x	x

	Analysis of SIKE 0000000000	

4. Conditionally swap "down"



	Analysis of SIKE	

4. Conditionally swap "down"

A '' :		0	0	1		1	1	1
<i>A</i> ′ :	x		x	x	x		x	x
A :	a_1		a_{k-1}	x	a _k		a _{R-2}	a_{R-1}

	Analysis of SIKE	
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5. Clear comparison bit



	Cost models 0000	Analysis of SIKE	

5. Clear comparison bit

<i>A''</i> :	0	 0	0	0	 0	0
A ' :	x	 x	x	x	 x	x
A :	a ₁	 a_{k-1}	x	a _k	 a _{R-2}	a_{R-1}

	Analysis of SIKE 000000●000	

7. Clear fan-out



A :	a ₁		a_{k-1}	x	a _k		a _{R-2}	a_{R-1}
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	Analysis of SIKE	
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8. Insertion complete

	Analysis of SIKE 0000000●00	

Costs of Tani's algorithm for SIKE

Previous analyses focused on the $p^{1/6}$ query cost of Tani's algorithm.

Using the Johnson vertex data structure, we find the SIKE secret at cost:

	Gates	Depth	Width	DW
Tani (query-optimal)	$p^{1/3+o(1)}$	$p^{1/6+o(1)}$	$p^{1/6+o(1)}$	$p^{1/3+o(1)}$

$$2^{434} \le p \le 2^{951}$$

	Analysis of SIKE	

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Tani (<i>DW</i> -optimal)	$p^{1/4+o(1)}$	$p^{1/4+o(1)}$	$p^{o(1)}$	$p^{1/4+o(1)}$

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Grover (G-optimal)	$p^{1/4+o(1)}$	$p^{1/4+o(1)}$	$p^{o(1)}$	$p^{1/4+o(1)}$

 $2^{434} \le p \le 2^{951}$

	Analysis of SIKE 00000000●0	

Comparison with parallel Grover

The classical controller can apply gates to every qubit to run Tani's algorithm. It could instead group them together and run Grover's search algorithm.



Grover and Rudolph. 2004. How significant are the known collision and element distinctness quantum algorithms

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	Analysis of SIKE	

Comparison with parallel Grover

 $O(p^{1/6})$ copies of Grover finds isogeny in time $O(p^{1/6})$.



Grover and Rudolph. 2004. How significant are the known collision and element distinctness quantum algorithms

	Analysis of SIKE 00000000●	

- Time/query-optimal Tani has $O(p^{1/6})$ classical control processors.
- We could reprogram these to run van Oorschot-Wiener (VW)



	Analysis of SIKE 00000000●	

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	Analysis of SIKE	

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Conclusion

 $O(p^{1/6})$ parallel instances of van Oorschot-Wiener find isogeny in time $O(p^{1/8})$, faster than the quantum algorithms.



		Summary
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Memory peripheral framework

- **1** Memory is a physical system that changes over time
- 2 A memory controller interacts with a memory
- 3 The cost of a computation is the number of interactions

Conclusions

- In a quantum computer, qubits are a peripheral of a classical computer.
- Quantum memory access has a linear gate cost.
- Active error correction gives cost to the identity gate.
- SIKE is more secure than previously thought.

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